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Goldilocks and the Three-Judge Panel: Spencer v. 
World Vision, Inc. and the Religious Organization 
Exemption of Title VII 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. a three-judge panel for the Ninth 
Circuit faced the question of whether a self-described “Christian 
humanitarian organization”1 qualified for an exemption from Title 
VII’s prohibition of religiously-based employment discrimination. In 
a split decision, the Ninth Circuit found that World Vision did meet 
the qualifications for the religious organization exemption, thereby 
precluding any legal challenges for religiously motivated employment 
discrimination. Although both judges in the majority agreed with 
this conclusion, each used a very different test to reach it. 
Additionally, the lone dissenting judge formulated her own unique 
test, which, if applied, would greatly limit the scope of Title VII’s 
religious organization exemption. This “Goldilocksian” trio of 
possible tests, each more restrictive than the last, naturally gives rise 
to the question of which if any of the three tests is “just right.” 
This Note argues that although the Ninth Circuit reached the 
correct conclusion, the test used by the majority is too broad in 
scope, creating an over-inclusive exemption to the religious 
discrimination prohibitions of Title VII. The test used in the 
dissenting opinion, on the other hand, is too narrow. Although it 
would be too much to say the test used in the concurrence is “just 
right,” it is the most appropriate of the three because it most 
effectively accommodates existing precedential constraints governing 
the religious organization exemption and strikes the most 
appropriate balance between protecting individual rights and the 
rights of religious entities.  
In arguing for this moderate approach to the religious 
organization exemption of Title VII, this Note proceeds as follows. 
Part II explains the facts and procedural history of Spencer. Part III 
provides an overview of Title VII’s religious organization exemption 
 
 1. Who We Are, WORLD VISION, http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/ 
who-we-are (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
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and relevant case law. Part IV summarizes the reasoning of each 
member of Spencer’s three-judge panel. Part V analyzes the three 
tests against the backdrop of existing precedent and constitutional 
and statutory requirements. Part VI concludes. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2006, World Vision, Inc., a global humanitarian organization, 
terminated three of its longtime employees because they “denied the 
deity of Jesus Christ and disavowed the doctrine of the Trinity.”2 
World Vision, whose mission includes “serv[ing] the poor as a 
demonstration of God’s unconditional love for all people,”3 requires 
all prospective employees to “agree with World Vision’s Statement of 
Faith and/or the Apostles’ Creed,” both of which profess, among 
other things, a belief in the deity of God the Father and Jesus 
Christ.4 At the time they were hired, each of the plaintiffs 
“confirmed that they ‘subscribe[d], wholeheartedly to the principles 
inherent’” in these statements.5 After several years of employment, 
however, each of the “[p]laintiffs discontinued their attendance at 
daily devotions and weekly chapels held during the workday.”6 Upon 
learning of this apparent lapse in devotion, World Vision 
representatives interviewed the plaintiffs and determined that each, in 
fact, “denied the deity of Jesus Christ.”7 Because this denial was 
clearly contrary to World Vision’s Statement of Faith and the 
Apostles’ Creed on which employment at World Vision was 
conditioned, the plaintiffs were terminated.8  
Following their termination, plaintiffs filed suit with a U.S. 
district court, alleging employment discrimination.9 This complaint 
was later amended10 to include the claim that the plaintiffs’ 
termination was based on religious “discrimination in violation of 
 
 2. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer II), 619 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 3. Job Opportunities at World Vision, WORLD VISION, http://www.worldvision.org/ 
content.nsf/about/hr-home?Open&lpos=lft_txt_Careers (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 4. Christian Commitment, WORLD VISION, http://www.worldvision.org/ 
content.nsf/about/hr-faith (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). 
 5. Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer I), 570 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282 (W.D. 
Wash. 2008) (citation omitted). 
 6. Id. (citation omitted). 
 7. Spencer II, 619 F.3d at 1111. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1280. 
 10. Id. at 1281. 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.”11 Shortly thereafter, World Vision 
responded by filing a motion to dismiss, which was later converted 
into a motion for summary judgment.12 World Vision argued that 
“as a religious organization it is exempt from the religious 
discrimination provisions of Title VII.”13 The plaintiffs disagreed, 
arguing that World Vision could not qualify as a religious 
organization and should not, therefore, be exempted from the 
requirements of Title VII.14 In the end, the district court agreed with 
World Vision, granting summary judgment in World Vision’s favor 
and finding that it qualified for the religious organization exemption 
provided for in Title VII.15  
III. TITLE VII’S RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION EXEMPTION 
In order to provide an appropriate framework in which to 
evaluate the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Spencer II, this section 
reviews the language and purpose of Title VII’s religious 
organization exemption as well as the Ninth Circuit cases on which 
the panel relied to guide its decision. The cases include EEOC v. 
Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co. and EEOC v. 
Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate. 
A. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
In 1964, Congress passed what has been billed as “the most 
comprehensive civil rights legislation ever enacted” in the United 
States.16 In passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended 
to curb “discrimination on account of race, color, religion, and 
national origin, in a broad variety of contexts, including . . . 
discrimination in employment.”17 The provisions governing 
employment discrimination are found in Title VII of the Act, which 
“makes it unlawful for an employer ‘to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to his 
 
 11. Spencer II, 619 F.3d at 1111. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1280.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 1289; see also Spencer II, 619 F.3d at 1126. 
 16. Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
31 BROOK. L. REV. 62, 62 (1964). 
 17. Id.  
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compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.’”18 Despite this seemingly clear proscription on employment 
discrimination, Congress created a fairly broad exemption for certain 
religious entities in an effort to “prevent excessive government 
entanglement” with religion and preserve “the constitutionally-
protected interest of religious organizations in making religiously-
motivated employment decisions.”19 The Civil Rights Act provides 
that “[t]his subchapter shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the 
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, 
educational institution, or society of its activities.”20 Thus, this 
exemption left a significant group of entities outside the scope of 
Title VII’s ban on religious-based employment discrimination.  
In creating this exemption, however, Congress failed to provide a 
clear definition of what constitutes a “religious corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society” within the context of 
Title VII.21 As such, it has largely been left to the courts to decide 
which entities qualify for the so-called “religious organization 
exemption” and which do not. Spencer II, like many cases before it, 
addressed this issue. Following are two of the most important cases22 
considered by both the district court and the Ninth Circuit in 
reaching their decisions in the Spencer cases.  
B. EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co. 
In EEOC v. Townley, the Ninth Circuit considered a religious 
discrimination claim filed by Louis Pelvas, a machinist who had been 
fired by Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Company 
 
 18. Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1283 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)). 
 19. Id. (quoting Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 623 (6th Cir. 
2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted).  
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).   
 21. Id.  
 22. Importantly, the Spencer II court also relied heavily on the Third Circuit’s reasoning 
in Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2007). In Leboon the 
Third Circuit formulated a factor test to be used to determine whether or not an entity 
qualifies as a religious organization for the purposes of the Title VII exemption. This test was 
based largely on the Ninth Circuit cases discussed below, EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 
859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988), and EEOC v. Kamehameha Schs./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458 
(9th Cir. 1993).  
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(“Townley”).23 Townley, a Florida-based company, manufactured 
equipment used in the mining industry.24 At the time they founded 
the company, the owners, who were born-again Christians, “made a 
covenant with God that their business would be a Christian, faith-
operated business.”25 This covenant was evident in the company’s 
business practices of including gospel messages in outgoing mail and 
on official company documents, as well as providing financial aid to 
churches and missionaries.26 Additionally, the company held “a 
devotional service once a week during work hours.”27  
When Pelvas was hired in 1979, no weekly devotional service was 
being held at the Eloy, Arizona plant where he was employed.28 
However, in 1982 an employee handbook was distributed, which 
stated, “All employees are required to attend the non-
denominational devotional services each Tuesday. Employees are 
paid for their time while attending these services.”29 Although Pelvas 
initially agreed to abide by this condition of employment—going so 
far as to sign a statement confirming his willingness to attend such 
services—he soon made a request to be exempted from these services 
on the basis that he was an atheist.30 Following a denial of his 
request, Pelvas filed a religious discrimination complaint with the 
EEOC, which led to the EEOC filing an action in federal court 
against Townley.31 The district court reviewed this action and 
granted summary judgment against Townley, finding that the 
company had violated Title VII “by requiring its employees to 
attend devotional services”32 and “by failing to accommodate Pelvas’ 
objection to attending the services.”33 The district court also “issued 
a permanent injunction prohibiting Townley from continuing the 
mandatory devotional services.”34  
 
 23. 859 F.2d at 612. 
 24. Id. at 611.  
 25. Id. at 611–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 26. Id. at 612. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding 
that Townley’s employment practices did, in fact, violate Title VII.35 
This decision hinged on the court’s determination that, contrary to 
Townley’s assertions, the company did not qualify for the religious 
organization exemption provided for in Title VII.36 In making this 
determination, the court noted that case law interpreting the scope 
of the religious organization exemption was “not very helpful.”37 As 
such, the court was left largely to its own devices to make the 
determination regarding Townley’s status. Rather than create a clear 
test to perform this analysis, the Ninth Circuit simply stated that 
“each case must turn on its own facts. All significant religious and 
secular characteristics must be weighed to determine whether the 
corporation’s purpose and character are primarily religious.”38 Under 
this fairly flexible standard, the court concluded that Townley’s 
“primarily secular” nature disqualified it from the religious 
organization exemption of Title VII.39 As such, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment against 
Townley.  
C. EEOC v. Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate 
In 1993, the Ninth Circuit once again considered the parameters 
of Title VII’s religious organization exemption in EEOC v. 
Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate.40 In contrast to Townley, which 
involved a corporation, Kamehameha involved a review of the 
religious nature of two schools whose employment policy required 
all teachers to be of the Protestant religion.41 The dispute in 
Kamehameha arose when Carole Edgerton, a non-Protestant, 
applied for a position with the schools but was denied employment 
based on the Protestant-only policy.42 Edgerton subsequently filed a 
complaint with the EEOC, which in turn filed suit in federal court 
against the schools.43 On appeal, however, a three-judge panel for 
 
 35. Id. at 613.  
 36. Id. at 613, 617–19.  
 37. Id. at 618.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 619. 
 40. 990 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1993).  
 41. Id. at 459.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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the Ninth Circuit unanimously reversed the district court’s decision, 
finding that “the Schools failed to establish their entitlement to” the 
Title VII exemptions.44 The Ninth Circuit arrived at this conclusion 
by considering six factors it believed were relevant to distinguishing a 
religious entity from a secular one.45 These factors included: “(1) 
ownership and affiliation, (2) purpose, (3) faculty, (4) student body, 
(5) student activities, and (6) curriculum.”46 After considering each 
of these in turn, the court determined that the schools could not 
qualify as religious organizations under the Title VII exemption. 
IV. SPENCER V. WORLD VISION, INC. 
A. Judge O’Scannlain’s Majority Opinion 
 
In a split decision, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit upheld a grant of summary judgment by the 
district court, holding that World Vision qualified for the religious 
organization exemption under Title VII and could not, therefore, be 
liable for religiously-based employment discrimination. Writing for 
the majority, Judge O’Scannlain began his opinion by noting that 
“[t]ypically, the question of whether an organization is religious for 
purposes of section 2000e-1 warrants little analysis.”47 Spencer II, 
however, provided a rare instance in which the answer to that 
question was not so obvious. According to Judge O’Scannlain, the 
Ninth Circuit had previously reviewed only two cases in which the 
answer to this question was not readily apparent—Townley and 
Kamehameha.48 Because neither of these cases had established a clear 
test to govern determinations such as this, the Spencer II court was 
left to fill the gaps, leading each member of the three-judge panel to 
formulate his or her own governing test.  
Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion was framed in large part by the 
relatively vague parameters of both Townley and Kamehameha. On 
the one hand, the Townley decision established a fairly broad scope of 
analysis, holding that “‘each case must turn on its own facts . . . 
 
 44. Id. at 460.  
 45. Id. at 461–63; see also Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer I), 570 F. Supp. 2d 
1279, 1284 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (utilizing the six factors set forth in Kamehameha), aff’d, 619 
F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 46. Spencer I, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 1284. 
 47. Spencer v. World Vision Inc. (Spencer II), 619 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 48.  See id. 
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[with a court weighing] [a]ll significant religious and secular 
characteristics . . . to determine whether the corporation’s purpose 
and character are primarily religious.’”49 On the other hand, as 
conceded by Judge O’Scannlain, “there is no denying that [the 
Kamehameha court] held that section 2000e-1 should be construed 
‘narrowly.’”50 Taking these together, Judge O’Scannlain believed 
that the court was simply required “to analyze, on a case-by-case 
basis, whether the ‘general picture’ of an organization is ‘primarily 
religious,’ taking into account ‘[a]ll significant religious and secular 
characteristics.’”51 Judge O’Scannlain rejected the calls by both 
parties in this case to apply a strict “factor test” like those found in 
Kamehameha or Leboon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center 
Ass’n,52 as he believed such a test could run afoul of the clear 
requirements of the First Amendment’s religion clauses.53  
“[T]he Free Exercise Clause,” noted Judge O’Scannlain, 
“‘clearly’ protects ‘organizations less pervasively religious than 
churches.’”54 Accordingly, Judge O’Scannlain refused to establish a 
factor test that would narrowly construe the category of religious 
organizations described in Title VII’s exemption.55 Additionally, the 
Establishment Clause demands “neutrality among religious 
groups,”56 meaning that “[t]he very act of [determining what 
activities do or do not have religious meaning] runs counter to the 
‘core of the [Establishment Clause].’”57 Judge O’Scannlain found 
support for this principle in Justice Brennan’s concurrence from 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, which argued that “‘determining whether 
an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case 
analysis . . . [, which] results in considerable ongoing government 
entanglement in religious affairs . . .  [and] raises [the] concern that 
 
 49. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 
1988)). 
 50. Id. at 1114.  
 51. Id. (quoting Townley, 859 F.2d at 618; EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 
990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993) (alteration in original)).  
 52. See supra note 22. 
 53. Spencer II, 619 F.3d  at 1115–19. 
 54. Id. (quoting Townley, 859 F.2d at 620 n.15). 
 55. Id. at 1113.  
 56.  Id. at 1114.  
 57. Id. at 1116 (quoting New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977)).  
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a religious organization may be chilled in its free exercise activity.’”58 
Based on this reasoning, Judge O’Scannlain elected to form his own 
test, which he claimed “minimizes any untoward differentiation 
among religious organizations and any unseemly judicial inquiry into 
whether an activity is religious or secular in nature.”59 Under Judge 
O’Scannlain’s test: 
[A] nonprofit entity qualifies for the section 2000e-1 exemption if 
it establishes that it 1) is organized for a self-identified religious 
purpose (as evidenced by Articles of Incorporation or similar 
foundational documents), 2) is engaged in activity consistent with, 
and in furtherance of, those religious purposes, and 3) holds itself 
out to the public as religious.60 
Applying this test, which “permits an institution to acknowledge 
its own religiosity” by “evaluat[ing] the purpose provided by the 
organization against the organization’s practice,”61 Judge 
O’Scannlain found that World Vision did qualify as a religious 
organization under Title VII and upheld summary judgment in its 
favor.62 
 
B. Judge Kleinfeld’s Concurring Opinion 
 
Although Judge Kleinfeld agreed with Judge O’Scannlain’s 
ultimate finding, he disagreed with the test Judge O’Scannlain 
applied, believing it to be “too inclusive.”63 From Judge Kleinfeld’s 
perspective, “Judge O’Scannlain’s test is too broad because it would 
allow nonprofit institutions with church affiliations to use their 
affiliations as a cover for religious discrimination in secular 
employment.”64 Judge Kleinfeld feared reliance on this test would 
force “courts to look into the hearts of [executives] and make a 
judgment about their real purposes.”65 To avoid the need for such an 
 
 58. Id. (quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343–44 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  
 59. Id. at 1119.  
 60. Id. (citing Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 1126.  
 63. Id. at 1127 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  
 64. Id. at 1130.  
 65. Id. at 1132.  
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“impractical” approach, Judge Kleinfeld proposed a test based on 
“one big objectively ascertainable difference: how [the 
organizations] charge.”66 Thus, under Judge Kleinfeld’s formulation:  
To determine whether an entitity is a “religious corporation, 
association, or society,” [a court must] determine whether it is 
organized for a religious purpose, is engaged primarily in carrying 
out that religious purpose, holds itself out to the public as an entity 
for carrying out that religious purpose, and does not engage 
primarily or substantially in the exchange of goods or services for 
money beyond nominal amounts.67 
In Judge Kleinfeld’s opinion, centering analysis on this final 
characteristic would allow a court to distinguish organizations 
“designed to exchange goods or services for money, from those 
designed to give them away except perhaps for nominal charges in 
order to serve a religious objective.”68 Even under this formulation, 
concluded Judge Kleinfeld, World Vision would qualify as a religious 
corporation.69 
 
C. Judge Berzon’s Dissenting Opinion 
 
In her dissent, Judge Berzon rejected both tests proposed by her 
colleagues as too expansive, fearing both “would transform what has 
always been a narrow exemption from the general prohibition on 
religious discrimination into an exceedingly broad one, with no 
obvious stopping point.”70 Based on her narrow reading of Title 
VII’s religious organization exemption, Judge Berzon would apply 
the exemption only to those organizations whose “primary 
activity . . . consists of voluntary gathering for prayer and religious 
learning.”71 
 
 66. Id. (explaining that, while a “hospital gets money by exchanging valuable services 
for their market value in cash,” “[t]he Salvation Army gives its homeless shelter and soup 
kitchen services away, or charges nominal fees, perhaps eight dollars a night for a bed worth 
fifty dollars a night”).  
 67. Id. at 1133.  
 68. Id. at 1132. 
 69. Id. at 1133.  
 70. Id. at 1134 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 1148. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Given the various legal constraints facing the Ninth Circuit 
panel—including the parameters of prior precedent and the 
competing interests of freedom of religion and individual 
employment rights—it is not surprising that the formation of a new 
test governing the scope of Title VII’s religious organization 
exemption was no easy task. As a result of this difficulty, the court 
failed to reach a consensus on the appropriate test for such a 
determination, leaving each member of the panel to cling to his or 
her own unique formulation. Although the ultimate outcome of 
Spencer II was correct, the test used in the majority opinion was not 
the most appropriate of the three. Of the three tests proposed in 
Spencer II, Judge Kleinfeld’s formulation most effectively balances 
the competing interests of the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment and the individual employment rights mandated under 
Title VII, while still accounting for the demands of prior precedent. 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should adopt Judge Kleinfeld’s test, 
or some slight variation thereof, to govern future decisions regarding 
the application of Title VII’s religious organization exemption. 
A. Accommodating Ninth Circuit Precedent 
Townley and Kamehameha established the precedential 
parameters for cases involving the religious organization exemption 
of Title VII in the Ninth Circuit. Together these cases stand for the 
principles that “[a]ll significant religious and secular characteristics 
must be weighed to determine whether the [organization’s] purpose 
and character are primarily religious,”72 and “that section 2000e-1 
[sh]ould be construed ‘narrowly.’”73 Using these principles as the 
governing standard, of the three possible tests found in Spencer II, 
Judge Kleinfeld’s formulation represents the most appropriate 
accommodation of the precedential demands of both Townley and 
Kamehameha. Whereas Judge O’Scannlain’s test is too over-inclusive 
in actual effect to meet the narrowness requirement of Kamehameha, 
Judge Berzon’s test is too narrow to allow for the weighing of “[a]ll 
 
 72. Id. at 1112 (majority opinion) (quoting EEOC v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 
F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988)).  
 73. Id. at 1112 (quoting EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 
460 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
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significant religious characteristics” required by Townley.74 As such, 
Judge Kleinfeld’s middle-of-the-road approach, though far from 
perfect, is truest to the demands of Ninth Circuit precedent. 
Although Judge O’Scannlain’s desire to allow “institution[s] to 
acknowledge [their] own religiosity”75 is a worthy theoretical goal to 
allow for greater religious freedom, in actual application this test may 
prove to be much too over-inclusive to fit within the precedential 
parameters of Kamehameha. As noted in both the concurrence and 
the dissent,76 by relying on so-called “neutral factors” for 
determining whether or not an organization is “religious,” Judge 
O’Scannlain’s test runs the risk of placing too much power in the 
hands of those organizations. This may allow secular entities to 
redefine themselves as “religious” and thereby receive undeserved 
exemption from certain requirements of Title VII, a problem which 
Kamehameha’s narrowness requirement undoubtedly seeks to avoid.  
Judge Kleinfeld’s test, though similar to Judge O’Scannlain’s in 
many regards, places important limits on the power of organizations 
to redefine themselves as religious by allowing the court to 
objectively review whether an organization “engage[s] primarily or 
substantially in the exchange of goods or services for money beyond 
nominal amounts.”77 This addition tempers Judge O’Scannlain’s 
formulation of the test, bringing it more in line with the 
“narrowness” requirement of Kamehameha. Additionally, Judge 
Kleinfeld’s shift away from Judge O’Scannlain’s focus on nonprofit 
status allows the court to more fully review “[a]ll significant religious 
characteristics” of organizations that may in fact be religious but lack 
the “corporate papers and nonprofit status” Judge O’Scannlain’s test 
demands.78  
Judge Kleinfeld’s test also avoids the narrowness problems of 
Judge Berzon’s formulation. Judge Berzon argues for a very limited 
reading of the phrase “religious organization,” effectively excluding 
from that classification all entities whose primary purpose is not 
limited to “voluntary gathering for prayer and religious learning.”79 
Such a narrow reading would force the court to ignore many other 
 
 74.  See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.  
 75. Id. at 1119.  
 76. See id. at 1130 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); id. at 1133–34 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 1133 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring) (alteration in original).  
 78. Id. at 1130.  
 79. Id. at 1148 (Berzon, J., dissenting).  
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obviously religious characteristics of an organization, thereby 
running contrary to the requirements of Townley. Judge Berzon’s 
test could also run the risk of withholding the exemption from 
“‘clearly’ religious” organizations simply because such organizations 
engage in activities that are not limited to prayer and religious 
learning.80 For instance, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, the Court 
reviewed a Title VII claim involving a church’s decision to terminate 
an employee from a church owned gym.81 The Court upheld 
application of Title VII’s exemption to the seemingly secular 
activities of this clearly religious organization, noting that “it is a 
significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain 
of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court 
will consider religious.”82 Judge Berzon’s test would fail to provide 
adequate deference to a large category of religious organizations 
whose functions include, in addition to voluntary prayer and 
religious learning, activities that might be viewed by a court as 
secular or nonreligious. Judge Kleinfeld’s test, however, avoids such 
problems by allowing the court to review “[a]ll significant religious 
characteristics” of an organization, which, as in the case of World 
Vision or The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, will often 
include much more than prayer and study. 
B. Balancing the Interests of Freedom of Religion and Individual 
Employment Rights 
Apart from effectively accommodating the established Ninth 
Circuit precedents, Judge Kleinfeld’s test also more effectively 
balances the competing interests of the First Amendment’s religion 
clauses and the protection of individual employment rights provided 
for in Title VII.83 History has demonstrated that “whenever religious 
 
 80. Id. at 1112 (majority opinion). 
 81. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 82. Id. at 337.  
 83. For a discussion on why these interests come into conflict, see Duane E. Okamoto, 
Comment, Religious Discrimination and the Title VII Exemption for Religious Organizations: 
A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1375, 1379 (1987) (“On the one hand, allowing a religious group to practice religious 
discrimination in employment matters advances first amendment [sic] goals by allowing 
religious groups to keep their beliefs intact. On the other hand, however, allowing a religious 
group to discriminate may seriously infringe upon the individual employee’s right to be free 
from discrimination, including discrimination based on religion.). 
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groups act as employers, the possibility exists that the groups’ 
religious rights will conflict with individual employees’ liberty 
rights.”84 Such conflicts raise significant challenges for reviewing 
courts given the fact that they must find a way to balance 
constitutional rights against rights guaranteed by what has been 
called “the most important civil rights legislation in American 
history.”85 Because any increase in one of those rights often comes at 
the expense of the other, any test formulated by the courts will often 
sacrifice one right for the other in attempting to create a workable 
standard.  
Such was the case in Spencer II. Judge O’Scannlain’s test, in an 
effort to avoid infringing on religious liberty—certainly a very worthy 
goal—created a test that could allow largely secular entities to 
infringe upon individual employment rights by escaping Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination in the workplace. On the other end of 
the spectrum, Judge Berzon’s test would greatly hamper the rights 
of religious organizations in favor of giving greater protection for 
employees. Both results would represent an unfortunate imbalance in 
the natural conflict between these competing rights. Judge 
Kleinfeld’s test, although imperfect in other regards, provides a 
middle-of-the-road approach that would likely create a more 
workable balance between these interests. By allowing religious 
organizations to demonstrate their truly religious nature through 
largely objective standards, Judge Kleinfeld’s test significantly 
protects religious freedom. However, by requiring a review of the 
extent and nature of an organization’s money making operations, 
Judge Kleinfeld’s test also provides protection for employees by 
making it less likely that a predominantly secular organization can 
take advantage of Title VII’s religious organization exemption. 
C. Potential Shortcomings of Judge Kleinfeld’s Test 
Importantly, although Judge Kleinfeld’s test is the most effective 
of the three tests created in Spencer II, it does raise its own concerns. 
Because it involves a review of an organization’s “exchange of goods 
or services,”86 Judge Kleinfeld’s test runs the risk of bumping up 
against the strict restraints of the Establishment Clause and entering 
 
 84. Id. at 1379. 
 85. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1 (3d ed. 2010). 
 86.  Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. (Spencer II), 619 F.3d 1109, 1133 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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what Judge O’Scannlain called a “constitutional minefield.”87 
Because “the prospect of church and state litigating in court about 
what does or does not have religious meaning touches the very core 
of the constitutional guarantee against religious establishment,”88 the 
courts have long been reluctant to penetrate the traditional “wall of 
separation”89 between church and state. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the 
Supreme Court established the primary test for determining when 
the government has violated the Establishment Clause. Under one of 
the prongs of the Lemon test, the Establishment Clause is violated “if 
there is excessive government entanglement with religion,” which 
may exist where the government requires a “comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance.”90 Fear of such 
entanglement has led the government to take a largely hands-off 
approach in many situations involving churches and religious 
organizations in order to avoid the appearance of a “continuing state 
surveillance.”91 In its most basic application, Judge Kleinfeld’s test 
may not require such continuing surveillance, but reviewing courts 
would be wise to avoid such a searching inquiry that would begin to 
implicate establishment issues. Through such avoidance, courts can 
continue to protect the ever-important religious rights guaranteed by 
the First Amendment. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit faced an unenviable challenge in Spencer v. 
World Vision, Inc. It is no easy task to formulate a workable test that 
remains faithful to existing precedent while appropriately balancing 
the religious freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment and the 
individual employment rights protected under Title VII. Although 
the final holding in Spencer II was correct, two of the three tests 
formulated by the court failed to effectively deal with the competing 
 
 87. Id. at 1115.  
 88. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 132–33 (1977).  
 89. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802) 
in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 510 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); see also Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“The First Amendment has erected a wall between church 
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.”).  
 90. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613, 619 (1971). 
 91. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI & JACLYN FABEAN CHERRY, TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2008) for a discussion of the government’s 
treatment of tax-exempt religious organizations. 
DO NOT DELETE 4/5/2011  7:41 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
48 
interests and precedential constraints associated with the religious 
organization exemption of Title VII. Although it would be a stretch 
to say Judge Kleinfeld’s test is “just right,” of the three possible tests, 
his formulation strikes the most appropriate balance of the important 
competing rights at issue and should therefore guide the Ninth 
Circuit in future determinations regarding Title VII’s religious 
organization exemption. 
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